Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Econometrica, 47(2). Peer-reviewed article.
Choices under risk depart from expected utility in systematic ways: outcomes are evaluated against a reference point, losses weigh more heavily than equivalent gains, and merely probable outcomes are underweighted relative to certain ones.
Why it is here A loss limit turns an unrealised loss into a reference point. The desk stores the day’s total as one number so it can be read against the allowance rather than against the morning’s high.
doi.org/10.2307/1914185
The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: theory and evidence
Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The Journal of Finance, 40(3). Peer-reviewed article.
Places loss aversion, mental accounting, regret aversion and self-control into one framework that predicts a general disposition to realise gains and defer losses.
Why it is here The disposition effect is measurable in a journal: the entry price, the planned stop and the outcome label for each completed trade make the pattern visible in a trader’s own records.
doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05002.x
Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?
Odean, T. (1998). The Journal of Finance, 53(5). Peer-reviewed article.
Across 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage, investors showed a strong preference for realising winners rather than losers. The pattern was not explained by rebalancing, by the higher costs of low-priced stocks, or by subsequent performance.
Why it is here This is why the desk asks for a planned stop and a planned target at the point of the journal entry, before the outcome is known.
doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00072
Professional trader discipline and trade disposition
Locke, P. R., & Mann, S. C. (2005). Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2). Peer-reviewed article.
Studies the trade-by-trade records of professional futures floor traders and relates how they dispose of winners and losers to what they earn.
Why it is here It is the closest published analogue to an evaluation record: professional traders inside a firm’s limits, with every trade observed.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.004
Do behavioral biases affect prices?
Coval, J. D., & Shumway, T. (2005). The Journal of Finance, 60(1). Peer-reviewed article.
Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders were highly loss-averse and regularly assumed above-average afternoon risk to recover morning losses, buying contracts at higher prices and selling at lower prices than had prevailed. The prices they set were reversed more quickly than those of other traders.
Why it is here This is the daily-loss rule measured from the inside: the losing morning, then the larger afternoon position taken to repair it. The desk treats one day’s total as a single figure precisely because the second half of that day is where the limit is usually touched.
doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00723.x
Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: the effects of prior outcomes on risky choice
Thaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Management Science, 36(6). Peer-reviewed article.
Risk taking depends on what came before: a prior gain is framed as house money and a prior loss is framed as an attempt to break even, and both framings change the risk a person will accept on the current decision.
Why it is here Both framings apply to the day after a large result. The desk compares a balance with the configured floor rather than with the previous session’s outcome, and records the day’s total separately from the trade journal.
doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.6.643
Up close and personal: investor sophistication and the disposition effect
Dhar, R., & Zhu, N. (2006). Management Science, 52(5). Peer-reviewed article.
Individual-level records show that investor sophistication accounts for much of the variation in the disposition effect, so an average across all investors hides wide differences between them.
Why it is here A group average is not a personal record. Everything the desk reports is derived from the figures entered for one account.
doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0473
Do investor sophistication and trading experience eliminate behavioral biases in financial markets?
Feng, L., & Seasholes, M. S. (2005). Review of Finance, 9(3). Peer-reviewed article.
Sophistication and trading experience together removed the reluctance to realise losses in a large brokerage sample, and the authors report an asymmetry in how the two act on the propensity to realise gains.
Why it is here Experience is a variable the desk cannot measure from an account state. It records the incidents, which is all a journal can honestly do.
doi.org/10.1007/s10679-005-2262-0
Who gambles in the stock market?
Kumar, A. (2009). The Journal of Finance, 64(4). Peer-reviewed article.
The propensity to gamble and investment decisions are correlated. Individual investors prefer lottery-type stocks, demand for them rises during economic downturns, and the socioeconomic factors that predict lottery spending also predict lottery-type investment.
Why it is here An evaluation fee buys a chance at a large account. The desk never presents a payout figure, a probability of passing, or a projected return, because those are the numbers that convert a risk exercise into a lottery ticket.
doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01483.x
Why do (some) households trade so much?
Linnainmaa, J. T. (2011). The Review of Financial Studies, 24(5). Peer-reviewed article.
When investors can learn about their ability by trading, trading to learn is rational even for someone who expects to lose on active investing. The model matches observed behaviour: underperformance, small initial stakes, and trading intensity that depends on past results.
Why it is here Evaluations are repeated for a reason. The cost of learning this way is paid in fees and in failed attempts, and the record of those attempts is the only part the trader keeps.
doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr009
The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). Cognitive Psychology, 17(3). Peer-reviewed article.
Documents a widely held belief that a player is on a streak and shows that the belief is a misperception of random sequences, in data where the sequences were measurably random.
Why it is here Losing runs are the routine output of a random process with a small negative or positive mean. The desk reports counts and totals, not streaks and momentum, because a run of results is not evidence about the next one.
doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(85)90010-6